North Korea: Seven Missiles Test-Fired 

Summary

North Korea test-fired seven ballistic missiles July 4, after conducting three missile tests July 2. North Korea is using these missile tests as a means of reaching political and military goals. 

Analysis

North Korea fired seven ballistic missiles into the East Sea/Sea of Japan on July 4 between 8 a.m. and 5:40 p.m. local time. South Korean officials said the missiles appeared to be variants of Scuds, each with a range of 248-310 miles. However, it is possible that the tests also included North Korea’s Nodong medium-range ballistic missile. Pyongyang did not test its Taepodong long-range missile or its satellite launch variant. These missile tests come on the heels of similar tests July 2, when North Korea test-fired three short-range missiles. 

There are two aspects to North Korea’s missile tests: the political and the military. 

Politically, North Korea is shooting for both domestic and foreign goals. There has been much speculation about the internal status of the North’s leadership and governing structures since Kim Jong Il’s alleged stroke in August 2008, with outside observers questioning Kim’s health, his grip on the country and his ability to manage a successful transition of power when he hands over the reins of government. Weapons trials can therefore be used to counter criticism and restore domestic faith in the regime, since military strength and self-sufficiency have long been the linchpins of Kim’s leadership. They serve as a means of reminding the public that external enemies are constantly bearing down on North Korea and that the regime has the independence and capability to fight off those enemies. And the tests have coincided with moves indicating that Kim’s third son, Kim Jong Un, is the likely successor, inspiring confidence that the impending transition (which is likely set for 2012) will be a smooth one. 

But Pyongyang also has foreign policy aims that it hopes to achieve with its various missile and nuclear tests. The country has often used its leverage to seek attention and aid from the international community, but in the current drive it has the specific goals both of pressuring the South Korean government (which it views as particularly unfriendly) and ultimately of gaining a private hearing with the United States. Establishing normal relations with Washington in the long run would enable Pyongyang to receive security guarantees and economic benefits. Not that the process will be quick, but when the North emerges from the current bout of provocations and weapons flaunting, its primary desire will be to use the tensions it has raised as a bargaining chip with the United States. 

Despite the focus on North Korea’s longer-range “arsenal,” Pyongyang has not yet demonstrated any meaningful military capability with the Taepodong series. The missiles exist only in small numbers and take days to move out to launch gantries (which are closely monitored in various ways by the United States, South Korea, Japan and other countries) and fuel, making them extremely vulnerable to air strikes and providing plenty of warning time before a launch. Their payload also is extremely limited. Indeed, North Korea is nowhere near having a deliverable nuclear weapon, and while not much is known about the Taepodong’s accuracy, its guidance systems are not thought to be refined enough to deliver a conventional payload with any meaningful degree of accuracy. The Taepodong can also likely be defeated by currently fielded American and Japanese ballistic missile defenses (though there are arrestors to such an intercept).

But North Korea’s shorter-range ballistic missile arsenal — composed of the KN-02, Hwasongs (Scuds modified in various ways) and the medium-range Nodong — do reflect a real military capability, one of which Seoul and Tokyo are well aware. Though accuracy is still a potential issue, North Korea has the quantity of weapons to make ballistic missile defense difficult and to deliver meaningfully large numbers of conventional warheads to major South Korean and Japanese cities.

North Korea rarely tests these shorter-range missiles by themselves, especially by “Western standards” of weapons development and certification. As it carefully calculates the political considerations and timing of its long-range tests, however, Pyongyang will include shorter-range missile tests, the costs of which become negligible. Take the failed or aborted launch of the Taepodong 2 in 2006; a half dozen shorter-range Hwasongs and Nodongs were launched along with it.

And in the successes and failures (especially the failures) in missile tests, North Korean engineers learn a great deal about their designs, their latest modifications and the operational performance of their weapons systems. These missile tests are not just firework shows for Pyongyang.